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Miksha: Declaring War on the War Powers Resolution

Note
DECLARING WAR ON THE WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION
Already possessing vast power over the country's foreign
relations,the executive, by acquiringthe authority to commit
the country to war, now exercises something approaching
absolute power over the life or death of every living Americanto say nothing of millions of other people all over the world.
There is no human being or group of human beings alive wise
and competent enough to be entrusted with such vast power.
Plenary powers in the hands of any man or group threatens all
other men with tyranny or disaster. Recognizing the
impossibility of assuring the wise exercise of power by any one
man or institution, the American Constitution divided that
power among many men and several institutionsand, in
doing so, limited the ability of any one to impose tyranny or
disaster on the country. The concentrationin the hands of the
Presidentof virtually unlimited authority over matters of war
and peace has all but removed the limits to executive power in
the most important single area of our nationallife. Until they
are restored the American people will be threatenedwith
tyranny or disaster.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

2
The population of the United States is approximately 280 million.
These quarter of a billion people are protected from foreign threat by the
United States Armed Forces comprised of approximately three and onehalf million men and women. 3 The United States Armed Forces are the
means by which the federal government provides for the common

1
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 90-797, at
26-27 (1967).
2
Resident Populationof the 50 States, the Districtof Columbia, and Puerto Rico: Census 2000,
Table 2, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at http://blue.census.gov/population/www/cen2OOO/tab02.
txt (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
3
DoDI01: An Introductory Overview of the Department of Defense, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., at
http://www.defenseink.mil/pubs/dodl01/dodl01.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
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defense and secures the blessings of liberty. 4 No single person, not even
the President of the United States, solely directs the use of these armed
5
forces.
Fearing the tyranny of a legislature or the tyranny of a single
executive, the Framers of the Constitution sought to separate the powers
of the government through a system of checks and balances. 6 War
powers are no different. 7 War powers can be defined as the authority to
direct the introduction of the armed forces into hostilities.8 Congress is
an integral part in the war powers design in our limited, constitutional
government. 9
This Note contends that the current balance of the war powers
embodied by the War Powers Resolution of 1973 is unconstitutional and
must be rectified through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 10 Part
II examines the background and development of the war powers during
the founding of this republic and follows their implementation through

See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the power to
raise, support, and regulate armies and a navy). Madison explained, "Security against
foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential
object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually
confided to the federal councils." THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 256 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
5
See generally THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1974) (discussing
the Congress as the rightful possessor of the war powers); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1993) (discussing the constitutional lessons of Vietnam and beyond and
that Congress has an important role in the direction of war); infra Part II (discussing the
original understanding and development of the war powers in American jurisprudence).
6
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND
THE CONSTITUTION 36 (1987) (discussing the Constitution's central theme of the .separation
of powers); FRED W. FRIENDLY & MARTHA J. H. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT
DELICATE BALANCE 277 (1984) (discussing the internal safeguards created by the Framers of
the Constitution to divide the power among three distinct branches and to give each
branch a check over the other branches); Thomas A. Ascik, In Republican Government, The
Legislative Authority Necessarily Predominates,in RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION 45 (H. Wayne
House ed., 1987) (discussing in great detail the source and justification for the separation of
powers with checks and balances).
7
See infra Part II.
8
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000).
9
See infra Part II.A-B.
10 See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1541-48 (2000)); infra Part IV.
4
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American history." These military events culminated in several midtwentieth century conflicts and fueled the passage of a central and
flawed piece of legislation, the War Powers Resolution of 1973.12 Then,
in Part 111, this Note turns to the legal and practical problems
incorporated in the War Powers Resolution, including the problem of
delegation of powers.' 3 Finally, Part IV proposes a Constitutional War
Powers Amendment to rectify the constitutional disaster that the War
Powers Resolution of 1973 fueled and to ensure that those in charge of
14
the armed forces will not attain "despotic preeminence."
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR POWERS

Despotic preeminence was exactly the fear of many of the Framers
whether in the realm of war or simply in the halls of Congress. 15 This
Part examines the war powers at the time of the framing of the
Constitution.' 6 After a review of the Constitution's broad separation of
powers principle, this Part details the development of the war powers in
early American history.' 7 Finally, this Part chronicles and develops the
War Powers Resolution of 1973.18

11
13

See infra Part I.A-C.
See infra Part lI.D.
See infra Part III.

14

ALLAN R. MILLETT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE:

12

A MILITARY

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 93 (1994) (stating that the Constitution "gave

national military forces two masters, neither of which could attain a despotic
preeminence"); see infra Part IV.
15
See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison) (explaining the virtues of a
system of government founded upon separation of powers with checks and balances).
Madison wrote:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than
that on which the objection [to the separation of powers] is founded.
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny .... [L]iberty requires that the three great
departments of power should be separate and distinct.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 30 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16
See infra Part II.A.
17
See infra Part II.B-C.
is
See infra Part II.D.
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The Framers and the U.S. Constitution

On the first day of the Constitutional Convention, the Framers
addressed a major fault with the Articles of Confederation: the executive
powers.' 9 The Framers retained a profound distrust of standing armies
and powerful executive control. 20 In the first few weeks, the debate
turned to the question of war within the larger debate of the separation
of executive and legislative powers. 21 The New Jersey Plan gave the
executive the power to direct all military operations, while Alexander
Hamilton's plan conceived of an executive holding the power to direct
war when declared by the Senate. 22 James Madison, the primary author

See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter RECORDS] (recounting the events of May 29, 1787). See generally David
Gray Adler, The President's War-Making Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
119 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989). Article Nine of the Articles of Confederation stated that
the Congress "shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war." ART. OF CONFED'N art. IX (1781).
20
See Adler, supra note 19, at 121-24; see also Kay Bailey Hutchison, America's Engagement
in the World at a New Century's Dawn: Legal and Ethical Implicationsfor the Use of Force, 53
SMU L. REV. 377, 379 (2000). "[The Framers] did not break with a monarchy in England
only to establish another monarchy in America. In drafting our constitution, they were
chiefly concerned with checking the abuses of executive power." Hutchinson, supra,at 379.
21
See 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 64-65. Mr. Pinkney of South Carolina supported a
"vigorous" executive but feared that the executive powers under the Articles of
Confederation had extended to peace and war, which would render the executive a
monarchy. Id. Mr. Rutledge, also of South Carolina, said that he was for vesting the
executive power in a single person, though he was not for giving him the power of war and
peace. Id. at 65. On the other side, Mr. Sherman viewed the Executive as nothing more
than an institution for carrying out the will of the legislature. Id. Mr. Wilson of
Pennsylvania supported a single magistrate but thought that the Prerogatives of the British
King could not be the proper guides. Id. Some of those powers, he pointed out, were
legislative in nature. Id. Among those powers to be withheld from the grand executive
were the powers of war and peace. Id. at 65-66. Always the masterful compromiser, Mr.
Madison steered the Convention back to a more basic discussion-that of defining the
executive powers. Id. at 66-67. For a rigorous discussion on the nature and development of
the separation of powers doctrine, see Louis Fisher, Point/Counterpoint: Unchecked
PresidentialWars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1638-44 (2000).
22
See 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 244, 292. Hamilton's plan was not formally before the
Convention, but several delegates used it. See 3 id. at 617. Hamilton conceived of the
Senate holding the exclusive power of declaring war. 3 id. at 622. Considering Hamilton's
general preference for executive power, this proposal is especially interesting.
19
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of the Constitution, agreed with several delegates that war power was
legislative in character. 23
The war powers discussion held an important position in the debates
as the Framers sought to satisfy two goals: first, that war should not be
entered into whimsically and, second, that armed conflict should
generally be avoided. 24 Suggestions to vest the war powers in the
executive were met by swift, contemptuous, and scornful responses; the
similarities between this proposal and the powers of the crown were too
great for the delegates. 25 Restricting the role of the executive would
deter armed conflict and make war difficult to enter. 26
A draft of the Constitution gave the legislature the power "to make
war" and the executive the power to be commander in chief of the armed
forces. 27 The Convention's full body considered and changed the "make

See 1 id. at 65-66, 73-74; Adler, supra note 19, at 121. "[Mr. Wilson] did not consider the
Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers.
Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war &
peace." 1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 65-66. "Making peace and war are generally
determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative powers." Id. at 73-74
24
See James Madison, Letter of Apr. 2, 1798, to Thomas Jefferson, 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 312, reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 96 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987). Mr. Madison stated, "The Constitution supposes what the History of all
Gov[ernment] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of power most interested in
war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war
in the Legisl[ature]." Id.
2
2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 318. Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts stated, "I never
expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war."
Id.
26
See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter STATE DEBATES].
Delegate James Wilson spoke directly to this before the Pennsylvania Convention:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against
it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men,
to involve us in such a distress; for the important power of declaring
war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made
with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this
circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our
national interest can draw us into war.
Id. Illustratively, Virginian delegate George Mason championed "clogging" rather than
facilitating the process to go to war. 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 319.
27
Supp. RECORDS, supra note 19, at 183, 188-89. This product of two months of
deliberations was presented to the Committee of Detail, the group charged with working
out the precise details of language, in late July of 1787. Id. at 183.
23
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war" clause because it considered that vesting that power in a sole
institution or individual was against republican ideals.28 The delegates
believed that the division of responsibility and power through a system
of checks and balances would ensure that power was not greatly
abused. 29 The solution was to change "make war" to "declare war," an
amendment which passed by an eight-to-one vote. 30 Thus, the language

2 id. at 313. These provisions had emerged from the Committee of Detail without
change. Supp. id. at 182.
29
See id. at 318-19. The complete debate follows:
[Mr. Dickenson moved] "[t]o make war."
Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting [of] this power in the
Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It w[ould] meet but once a
year. The H[ouse] of Rep[resentatives] would be too numerous for
such deliberations. The Senate would be the best depositary, being
more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper
resolutions.... It would be singular for one authority to make war,
and another peace.
Mr. Butler. The Objections ag[ain]st the Legislature lie in a great
degree against the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the
President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make
war but when the Nation will support it.
Mr. M<adison> and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare," striking
out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks.
Mr. Sharman [sic] thought it stood very well. The Executive
[should] be able to repel and not commence war. "Make" [is] better
than "declare[,]" the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to
empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elseworth. [Tihere is a material difference between the cases
of making war, and making peace. It should be more easy to get out of
war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. [Pleace
attended with intricate [and] secret negociations [sic].
Mr. Mason was [against] giving the power of war to the
Executive, because not <safely> to be trusted with it; or to the Senate,
because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging
rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred
"declare" to "make."
On the Motion to insert declare-in place of Make, it was agreed to
[NH, no; MA, abst., CT, no, but after Mr. King remarked that "make"
war might be understood to "conduct" it which was an Executive
function, Mr. Elseworth changed to aye; PA, aye; DE, aye; MD, aye;
VA, aye; NC, aye; SC, aye; GA, aye].
Id. (citations omitted or incorporated as in Mr. King's remarks).
30
Id.; see also Alexander C. Linn, International Security and the War Powers Resolution, 8
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 733 (2000) (discussing the significance of the make/declare
28
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finalized by the Committee of Style and Arrangement included
"declare." 3' In the end, the conduct of war was to be within the purview
of the President; the initiation of hostilities would rest with the
32
legislators.
Alexander Hamilton, the advocate of strong executive power, even
supported this secondary role for the President. 33 Hamilton argued that
the President would rightly differ from other executives in two ways. 34
First, the President would only command the military under legislative
directive, rather than for all time. 35 In addition, the President would then
serve as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, rather than holding all
military decision-making powers.36 These views are iterated throughout

discussion as suggesting that the Framers wished to empower Congress rather than the
Executive).
31
2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 570, 595.
32
See 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 263. Mr. Butler summarized the debate as such
in 1788:
It was at first proposed to vest the sole power of making peace or war
in the Senate; but this was objected to as inimical to the genius of a
republic, by destroying the necessary balance they were anxious to
preserve. Some gentlemen were inclined to give this power to the
President; but it was objected to, as throwing into his hands the
influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his
country in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction. The
House of Representatives was then named; but an insurmountable
objection was made to this proposition-which was, that negotiations
always required the greatest secrecy, which could not be expected in a
large body. The honorable gentleman then gave a clear, concise
opinion on the propriety of the proposed Constitution.
Id.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 417-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton, arguing in support of the Constitution, points out that "in most of these
particulars [such as the Commander in Chief role], the power of the President will
resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain and the governor of New York." Id. at
417.
34
Id.
35
Id. The President would "have only the occasional command of such part of the
militia of the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the
Union." Id. For example, "[tihe king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have
at all times the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions." Id.
"[Tiherefore, the power of the President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or
the governor." Id.
36
Id. at 418. Hamilton points out that the President serves merely as commander in
chief, "while [the power] of the British King extend[ed] to the declaring of war and to the
33
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language of the day was slightly different.
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However, the

Language and Looming ConstitutionalPrinciples

"Declare" currently has a different connotation than it did two
hundred years ago.39
Although "declare" today sways toward
"announce," as early as 1552, it was synonymous with "commence" or
an initiation of hostilities.40 "Declaration" meant to proclaim a state of
war and included all the international legal implications that war
42
entails. 41 A logical division existed between declaring and making war.

raising and regulating of fleets and armies-all which, by the Constitution under
consideration, would appertain to the legislature." Id.
37 See, e.g., 4 STATE DEBATES, supra note 26, at 107-08. James Iredell, later a Supreme
Court Justice, delineated the powers of the President in a speech to the North Carolina
legislature that reflects The FederalistNo. 69:
In almost every country, the executive has command of the military
forces. From the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to
be delegated to one person only. The secrecy, dispatch, and decision,
which are necessary in military operations, can only be expected from
one person. The President, therefore, is to command the military
forces of the United States, and this power I think a proper one; at the
same time it will be found to be sufficiently guarded. A very material
difference may be observed between this power, and the authority of
the king of Great Britain under similar circumstances. The king of
Great Britain is not only the commander in chief of the land and naval
forces, but has power, in time of war, to raise fleets and armies. He
also has the power to declare war. The President has not the power of
declaring war by his own authority, nor that of raising fleets and
armies. The powers are vested in other hands. The power of declaring
war is expressly given to Congress, that is, to the two branches of the
legislature ....
They have also expressly delegated to them the
powers of raising and supporting armies, and of providing and
maintaining a navy.
Id.
38
See Adler, supra note 19, at 123.
39
40

Id.
Id.; see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 484 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter DICTIONARY

1996] (defining "declare" as "to make known formally or officially" and "declare war" as
"to state formally the intention to carry on armed hostilitities against").
41 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.N.Y. 1806). Justice Paterson
explained international law: "In the case of invasive hostilities, there cannot be war on the
one side and peace on the other .... There is a manifest distinction between our going to
war with a nation at peace, and a war being made against us by an actual invasion, or a
formal declaration." Id. at 1230.
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This division, in modem terms, then, corresponds to initiating and
conducting war.

43

Another term that has expanded in its connotation is "commander in
chief." Commander in chief is the title of the highest officer in a
particular chain of command. 44 It is not a new term-Charles I introduced
it in 1639. 45 The officer was to be the first General and Admiral to direct
war once authorized or begun.46 Thus, the President was thought of as a
subordinate who, once given a mission by Congress, would execute it
within authorized bounds. Because of its size and lengthy procedures,
Congress would not be capable of conducting war in a way resembling
proper military practice, so that responsibility fell to the President as
47
Commander in Chief.
Certainly, some incidents or crises do not allow time for Congress to
deliberate; swift action can be necessary. 48 However, the Framers only
believed these circumstances to be defensive events, as they considered
the President to possess the ability to repel invasions or attacks. 49 The
power to repel sudden attacks permitted the executive to hold an enemy

See, e.g., JOHN BOUVIER, BouVIER's LAW DICTIONARY (1889). In the nineteenth century,
Bouvier defined "make" as "to perform or execute" and "declaration of war" as "the public
proclamation of the government of a state, by which it declares itself to be at war with a
foreign power." Id.
43
See DICrIONARY 1996, supra note 40, at 394, 929 (defining "initiate" as "to set going by
taking the first step, begin" and "conduct" as "to direct the course of, manage or control").
44
See id. at 379 (defining "commander in chief" as "the supreme commander of all the
armed forces of a nation" and "commander" as one who "has control or authority over;
rule"); see also Adler, supra note 19, at 126.
45
Adler, supra note 19, at 126.
46
1 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 292.
47 See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (stating that the President shall be the Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy). During the Constitutional Convention Mr. Pinkney "opposed the
vesting [of the war] power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It w[oul]d
meet but once a year. The H[ouse] of Rep[resentatives] would be too numerous for such
deliberations." 2 RECORDS, supra note 19, at 318.
48
See generally Fisher, supra note 21. Fisher argues that "the Framers deliberately
divided government by making the President the Commander in Chief and reserving to
Congress the power to finance military expeditions. The Framers rejected a government in
which a single branch could both make war and fund it." Id. at 1645.
49
See supra note 29. Such a power is also implied in Article IV, Section 4 because the
United States is bound to protect each state against invasion. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. This
is only possible with an ever-present institution, the President. See generally Fisher, supra
note 21, at 1645.
42
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at bay while Congress made a final and appropriate decision of how to
handle or respond to the attack.5 0 Thus, the two branches of government
51
had particular responsibilities.

50 MERLO J. PUSEY, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR 47 (1969). This power was also similar to
that granted to the colonial governors prior to the new Constitution. See, e.g., MASS. CONST.
of 1780, art. VII. Massachusetts carefully spelled out the governor's power to include
grants to "repel, resist, [and] expel attempts to invade the Commonwealth." Id. Some
scholars confuse this issue of presidential war prerogative and find it hopelessly unclear.
See, e.g., JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE POWER TO LEAD: THE CRISIS OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 114 (1984). Burns assumes the President was meant to be so similar to the
monarchs of the past:
It was obvious, of course, that the executive must have extensive
authority in these areas; that's what kings, prime ministers, and
presidents were for. The great John Locke himself, as well as other
political philosophers to whom the Founders had gone to school,
argued for "Prerogative" empowering executives to cope with
accidents and crises. Acutely aware, however, of the long record of
kings and others who had plunged their nations into war without
popular or legislative consent, the Framers tried to hedge in
presidential war-making power as closely as possible. They proposed
to grant him power to respond to surprise attack but deny him power
to make war.
In that day as this, though, it was almost impossible to draw the
line. Leaving the issue unresolved, the Framers took some comfort in
the impeachment power of Congress.
Id. David Adler reads the Constitutional design differently:
There is no intimation in the records of the Constitutional Convention
or of the state ratifying conventions that executive power includes the
right to make war ....
The record establishes that neither the
commander-in-chief clause nor the executive power clause affords
support for the claim that the President is empowered to commence
hostilities. Indeed, such authority was specifically withheld from the
President.
Adler, supra note 19, at 132.
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, §§ 1-2. The Constitution provides:
Article I, Section 8. The Congress shall have Power... To declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no
Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than
two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Article II, Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America ....
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The war powers are but a small part of the grand constitutional
design of separated powers. 5 2 Congress does have the authority to
delegate limited powers that it has been given by the Constitution.5 3 The
courts have become increasingly willing to uphold delegation against
4
constitutional attack, especially when foreign affairs are involved.5
Under the current delegation jurisprudence, Congress must provide for
the executive (1) an "intelligible principle" to follow, (2) a specific policy
or objective, and (3) limits circumscribing that power.55 The United
States Supreme Court has used its nondelegation doctrine to invalidate
laws only twice in the doctrine's history. 56 Although these two cases
predated the delineation of the three-prong test in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v.
United States,5 7 the analyses were quite similar. 58 The Court found the
59
lack of specific direction, objectives, or standards to be dispositive.

Article II, Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States ....
Id. art. II, §§ 1-2.
52 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Madison argued,
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the
legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different
modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their
common dependence on the society will admit.
Id. at 322 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
53 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Star-kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275
F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A 1959).
54 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding the Iranian hostage
financial settlement).
55
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 327-29 (holding that a congressional resolution, which
gave the President the power to prohibit arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay, was not an
unconstitutional delegation of power); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 409 (1928) (creating the intelligible principle analysis); Star-kist Foods, 275 F.2d at 480
(delineating a three-prong test from the long history of delegation cases in the foreign
relations realm).
56 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act to be unconstitutional delegations of
power); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and Petroleum Code to contain unconstitutional
delegations of power).
57 275 F.2d 472.
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C. Pre-War Powers Resolution Understandingand Application
In 1775, notwithstanding the unanimous decision to appoint George
Washington as General of the Army, the Continental Congress limited
his powers to only executing its directives because of a natural distrust of
military power. 60 Nineteenth-century jurists agreed that the war clause
meant that the President could not lawfully initiate war because only
Congress could initiate it.61 However, modem commentators disagree
over whether nineteenth-century Presidents followed this constitutional
principle, and nearly all criticisms of Presidents for abuse of authority
62
arose during the twentieth century.

Compare Star-kist Foods, 275 F.2d at 480 (holding that Congress "must tell the President
what he can do by prescribing a standard which confines his discretion and which will
guarantee that any authorized action he takes will tend to promote rather than flout the
legislative purpose"), with Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541-42 (holding that the delegation
of code-making authority to the President was unconstitutional because it was so broad
and virtually unfettered), and Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 431-33 (holding that the
President may only act within congressional declarations of policy that provide a
framework and when the President makes clear statements and findings within that
framework).
59 See Schechter Poultry,295 U.S. at 541-42; PanamaRefining, 293 U.S. at 431-33.
60 See Adler, supra note 19, at 127. Washington was ordered "'punctually to observe and
follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as [he] shall receive from this, or a
future Congress of these United Colonies, or Committee of Congress."' Id.
61
See, e.g., 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 55 (0. W. Holmes, Jr. ed.,
1884); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 87
(1891). James Kent, the prominent jurist, wrote,
[1it is essential that some formal public act, proceeding directly from
the competent source, should announce to the people at home their
new relations and duties growing out of a state of war, and which
should equally apprise neutral nations of the facts. ... [W]ar cannot
lawfully be commenced on the part of the United States without an act
of Congress.
1 KENT, supra, at 55. Justice Story wrote, "The power of declaring war is... so critical and
calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation, and the successful revise of all the
councils of the Nation." 2 STORY, supra, at 87. This support extended into the early
twentieth century as evidenced by the 1929 writings of Westel W. Willoughby, eminent
political scientist and expert in constitutional law. WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1560 (1929). "The right of making war
belongs exclusively to the supreme or sovereign power of the state. This power in all
civilized nations is regulated by the fundamental laws or municipal constitution of the
country. By our own Constitution, the power is lodged in Congress." Id.
62
See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 13 (1995) [hereinafter FISHER, WAR
POWER]. One case, however, is of particular note. The Mexican War, after congressional
5
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In early decisions, the Supreme Court defined two kinds of
declarations and two kinds of war: regular and conditional declarations
for perfect and imperfect wars. 63 "Perfect" wars are the general and
unlimited; conversely, the "imperfect" wars represent limited conflicts. 64
Thus, "perfect" wars are large-scale, multiple-theater, sovereign-versussovereign types of conflicts; "imperfect" wars, in twenty-first century
terms, are low-intensity conflicts with potentially short duration, limited
goals, and restricted participation.6 In Bas v. Tingy,66 the Supreme Court
held that Congress has jurisdiction over both perfect and imperfect
wars. 67 The Court reasoned that imperfect wars are wars in the
constitutional sense because the government authorizes them just the
same.6 8

investigation, was found to be "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the
President of the United States." Adler, supra note 19, at 138. President Polk ordered the
army into the area and told Congress, "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United
States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood on American soil." PUSEY,
supra note 50, at 61. On January 13, 1846, President Polk ordered General Taylor to invade
Mexico and take position on the south shore of Rio Grande del Norte. Id. However, it was
not until the May of 1846 that Polk submitted his request for a declaration of war. Id. The
Congress argued that Polk's reasons for invading were false, and the after-the-fact process
was unconstitutional. Id.
63 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37,40 (1800).
64 Id. (discussing the eighteenth-century understanding of war); see generally MILLEIT &
MASLOWSKI, supra note 14, at 22-123; John C. Yoo, Point/Counterpoint:Kosovo, War Powers,
and the MultilateralFuture,148 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1689-90 (2000) (same).
6
See Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40.
6
Id. at 37.
67 Id. at 40-41. The Court reasoned,
[Hiostilities may subsist between two nations, more confined in its
nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and
this is more properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and
because those who are authorized to commit hostilities, act under
special authority, and can go no farther than to the extent of their
commission. Still, however, it is a public war, because it is an external
contention by force, between some of the members of the two nations,
authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a war between the two
nations, though all the members are not authorized to commit
hostilities such as in a solemn war, where the government restrains the
general power.
Id. (emphasis added).
68 Id. One year later, the Court explained that Congress may authorize general hostilities
or partial war. Talbot v. Seemen, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). The Court reasoned that,
because "[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, [are]
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In United States v. Smith,69 the New York federal circuit court
reviewed hostilities against Spanish forces. 70 The court held that the
President's power was limited to responding decisively and that the
power to initiate hostilities was exclusively vested in Congress. 7' If an
invasion of American soil occurs, a state of war exists, making a
congressional declaration superfluous. 72
The court held that the

vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides" in resolving
the question of whether a war in fact existed. Id.
69 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
70 Id. at 1200.
71 Id. at 1199 (pointing out that "Congress [has] the power of declaring war; and when
that is done, the [Plresident is to act under it"). The court held that "Congress [has] alone
the constitutional right to elect to go to war; but in case of an actual war declared or waged
by a foreign power, there is no option, war does already exist; a defensive war, without the
agency of congress; a war defacto." Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
72 Id. The court summarized the state of the law at the time as such:
Put the case of actual war commenced by Spain, against the United
States, when war has not been declared by congress, would it not be
permitted to the president, to call out the military forces of the Union,
to repel the aggression? Certainly it would .... Offensive war once
begun, the nation attacked succeeds to all the rights of legitimate
warfare. It may merely resist its enemy, or it may repel its aggressions
by a stroke at the head, the heart, or the extremities. All are equally
justifiable ....
I ask, whether a war has not existed between this country and
other nations, without a declaration of war by congress?... And will
it be denied, that we were then in a state of actual war [after the attack
by Spain]? Yet congress had declared no war. Was the president of the
United States justifiable for this act of hostility, commenced without
the authority of congress? Certainly he was. It can never be denied to
the executive to resist an attack. He is constitutionally bound to
defend the United States against all foreign attacks, as well as domestic
insurrections, and in the way best calculated in his judgment to insure
success. A law was afterwards passed by congress [2 Stat. 129],
providing the ways and means of carrying on the war, then existing,
and so existing; and let it be remarked, continuing to exist, without any
positive or formal declaration by congress. If war then can exist
between the United States and a foreign nation without a declaration
of war by congress, it belongs to the executive of the Union to ascertain
the fact, and to declare the condition of the nation,-to say if actual war
exists or not. The constitution delegates to the executive the power to
protect and preserve the peace of the United States,-to communicate
with foreign nations; and he is the constitutional organ through which
the people derive their knowledge of our political relations with
foreign powers.
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President would then be authorized to initiate offensive actions against
the attacking enemy because a state of war already existed between the
nations. However, no presidential right to intervene in a foreign war or
against a peaceful enemy existed because Congress was charged with
73
declaring the change from peace to war.
These decisions continued through the turn of the century and
World War II. In 1895, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Sweeny,74
ruled that the Commander-in-Chief Clause granted the President
75
supreme and undivided command to prosecute a successful war. As
76
recently as 1942, the Court recognized congressional supremacy. The
twentieth century saw a rapid change in the application of the war
powers, too. 77 Presidents Theodore Roosevelt through Woodrow Wilson

Id. Thus, Congress actually took up the issue of the attack on the Union and directed the
President in his actions, which acted as a functional declaration although it was already
unnecessary due to the attack. An Act for the Protection of the Commerce of the United
States Against the Tripolitan Cruisers, 2 Stat. 129 (1802).
73 Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230-31. The court reasoned the difference:
There is a manifest distinction between our going to war with a nation
at peace, and a war being made against us by an actual invasion, or a
formal declaration. In the former case, it is the exclusive province of
congress to change a state of peace into a state of war. A nation,
however, may be in such a situation as to render it more prudent to
submit to certain acts of a hostile nature, and to trust to negotiations
for redress, than to make an immediate appeal to arms. Various
considerations may induce to a measure of this kind; such as motives
of policy, calculations of interest, the nature of the injury and
provocation, the relative resources, means and strength of the two
nations, &c. and, therefore, the organ intrusted [sic] with the power to
declare war, should first decide whether it is expedient to go to war, or
to continue in peace; and until such a decision be made, no individual
ought to assume an [sic] hostile attitude; and to pronounce, contrary to
the constitutional will, that the nation is at war, and that he will shape
his conduct and act according to such a state of things.
Id.
74 157 U.S. 281 (1895).
75 Id. at 284.
76 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the President executes the directives of
Congress). Chief Justice Stone stated for the Court, "The Constitution thus invests the
President with the power to wage war which Congress has declared and to carry into effect
all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for the government and regulation
of the Armed Forces." Id. at 26.
77 Compare infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text, with supra notes 60-6.2 and
accompanying text.
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were active in numerous armed conflicts abroad. 78 Politics increasingly
trumped institutional protections, and the post-World War II era saw the
growth of presidential unilateralism. 79 For example, President Harry S.
Truman's actions relative to the Koreas represented presidential warmaking.80 Truman sent troops to fight in Korea without a declaration of
war or an action of Congress. 8' President Truman, with the advice of his
Secretary of State, justified his actions by referring to his Article II
powers.8 2 He decided not to ask Congress to declare war because his
Administration feared that a declared war would grow out of hand
rather than remaining limited and short.8 3 The President responded
affirmatively to a journalist's suggestion that Korea was only a "police
action" and not a "war."84 The Representatives neither discussed, nor
acted upon, their constitutional duty.8 5
Only one Congressman
repeatedly questioned the institutional silence because he worried that
the President would take it to mean that he could send troops anywhere
86
in the world without the slightest voice of Congress in the matter.

7
See Joseph R. Avella, Whose Decision to Use Force?, 26 PRES. STUD. Q. 485 (1996). The
Roosevelt Corollary, the update of the Monroe Doctrine, dominated American foreign
policy towards the Western Hemisphere at the beginning of the twentieth century. See 2
WALTER LAFEBER, CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 199-200 (1993).
In 1904, Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States alone had the right to police
the little countries of this hemisphere, to protect property, maintain order, and make sure
they paid their debts. Id. Woodrow Wilson ordered Marines to Veracruz in 1914, told
General John Pershing to enter Mexico in March 1915, and sent soldiers to Haiti in 1915 and
the Dominican Republic in 1916. Avella, supra, at 487. Wilson undertook each of these
actions without congressional authorization. Id. The United States also had intervened in
Columbia to create Panama for a future canal. See 2 LAFEBER, supra, at 193-96.
79 See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
80
See John C. Yoo, The Continuationof Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding
of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 178-79 (1996).
51

82

83

See id.
Id.
WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND

ABROAD SINCE 1750, at 489 (1989) [hereinafter LAFEBER, AGE].

84
85

Id.
Id.
86
See id. at 490. Illustratively, during the Korean Conflict, Truman seized a strikethreatened steel mill claiming inherent powers. Id. The President's legal spokesman, Mr.
Baldridge, went before Federal District Judge David A. Pine to defend the seizure against
claims of unconstitutionality. Id. The in-court interchange follows:
The Court:
So, when the sovereign people adopted the
Constitution, it enumerated the powers set up in the Constitution, but
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President Eisenhower also expanded presidential power through his
Chinese and Southeast Asian policies, but did so with respect and
aplomb.8 7 In early 1955, President Eisenhower asked Congress for broad
authority to use U.S. forces in that area.88 In a display of trust, Congress
quickly agreed and gave broad powers by mere resolution.8 9 The
resolution set a historic precedent for later grants of power by Congress
to the President. 90

limited the powers of Congress and limited the powers of the
judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the Executive. Is that what
you say?
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the
Constitution.
MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE 121 (1977). See also ALAN F.
WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE 59-65 (1958). Mr. Baldridge later

clarified his argument in that the President must still act within the Constitution and only
has the vast powers in a grave national emergency. MARCUS, supra, at 306 n.89.
87
88

LAFEBER, AGE, supranote 83, at 525.

Id. President Eisenhower urged Congress to act very quickly to provide measures by
which he could respond to China's attacks and seizures near Formosa. See FISHER, WAR
POWER, supra note 62, at 105-06. He preferred to act along with Congress because a
"suitable Congressional resolution would clearly and publicly establish the authority [for
him] ...to employ the armed forces ... promptly and effectively for the purposes
indicated if in his judgment it became necessary. It would make clear the unified and
serious intentions of our Government, our Congress, and our people." Special Message to
the Congress Regarding United States Policy for the Defense of Formosa, PUB. PAPERS 207, 210
(Jan. 24, 1955). President Eisenhower also requested that the resolution be temporary in
character. Id. The expiration would be contingent upon the President's ability to report to
Congress that peace and security in the region were assured. Id.
89 See H.R. REP. No. 84-4, at 4 (1955) (reporting unanimously the resolution regarding
actions in the Formosa Straits out of the Foreign Affairs Committee). The committee
concluded that the resolution made it clear that the people supported the President and
that the Constitution was satisfied by the cooperation between the branches. Id. The bill
found little resistance and was passed only five days after President Eisenhower sought the
approval of Congress. See H.R.J. Res. 159, 84th Cong., 69 Stat. 7 (1955); 101 CONG. REC. 99495 (1955); FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 105-06. The statute authorized the
President to use the armed forces "as he deem[ed] necessary for the specific purpose of
securing and protecting Formosa ...against armed attack." H.R.J. Res. 159. The authority
extended to securing and protecting lands and positions related to that area too. Id.
Congress also passed the expiration language that President Eisenhower had asked for. Id.;
see supra note 88.
90 See LAFEBER, AGE, supra note 83, at 525.
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However, such congressional-presidential cooperation was short
lived. 91 Soon, subsequent Administrations filled the power vacuum left
by the silent Congresses. 92 Nonetheless, in 1964, the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution gave President Johnson a blank check and very wide latitude
to deal with the conflict in Vietnam. 93 In the wake of this resolution,
however, many questioned the truthfulness of the facts presented by the
President, which supplied yet another reason for many to be skeptical of
the President's actions. 94 In fact, some in Congress took issue with
Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach's characterization of the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution as a functional equivalent to a declaration of
war. 95 In the wake of Vietnam and the political atmosphere created by
the generally unpopular conflict, the war powers were at the fore of
96
political discussion.

91 See generally FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 92-113. Very broad powers had
been invoked to justify involvement in Southeast Asia. See id. at 114-23. John F. Kennedy
stated he was acting by executive order, presidential proclamation, and inherent powers,
not under any resolution or act of Congress, when he brought the United States to the brink
of war with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See LAFEBER, AGE, supra
note 83, at 525.
92 See PUSEY, supra note 50, at 6. For example, in 1966, the State Department proclaimed
wide foreign relations powers that included the legitimate deployment of forces abroad
and conduct of military operations under the sole authority of the President. Id. "Foggy
Bottom" stated blandly that the President held prime responsibility for foreign relations
and that such responsibilities carry very broad powers that include the power to deploy
and commit forces abroad. Id.
93 FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 115-18. The Resolution allowed the Commander
in Chief to, "as the President determines, take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force," to help the Southeast Asian nations in their defense of freedom. Pub. L. No.
88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (Aug. 10, 1964). The range of armed force could only be terminated in
two ways: presidential determination or by concurrent resolution of Congress. Id.
94 See FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 115-17. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee investigated the incident in 1968 and cast much doubt on the events in the
Tonkin Gulf, calling them, at one point in the hearing, based on "unfounded speculation."
The Gulf of Tonkin, The 1964 Incidents, Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1968), reprinted in JOHN GALLOWAY, THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

237-406, 320 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings].
95 See Hearings, supra note 94, at 52; Speech of Senator Wayne Morse on the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution (Feb. 28, 1968), reprinted in GALLOWAY, supra note 94, at 443-55, 450; see
generally JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIRILLUSION AND REALITY 181-237 (1969).
96

See Thomas F. Eagleton, Congress: Does It Abdicate Its Power? 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.

REV. 1, 3-4 (2000) (discussing the turbulent political atmosphere and the public and

congressional interest in the war powers).
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D. The War Powers Resolution of 1973
1.

Development

Upset with the perceived injustice done to the Constitution's
separation of powers, several Senators drafted a bill to correct these
perceived excesses of the President in Vietnam. 97 The intent was to
frame a statute that would require the President to seek authorization
from Congress in situations not involving emergencies requiring

See S. 2956, 92d Cong. (1971); R. GORDON HOXIE, COMMAND DECISION AND THE
A STUDY IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ORGANIZATION 270 (1977);
Eagleton, supra note 96, at 2-6. In 1970, U.S. Senator Thomas Eagleton approached Senator
Frank Church, a major player on the Foreign Relations Committee from Idaho, about
reasserting the congressional role in the war decision-making process. FISHER, WAR
POWER, supra note 62, at 115 (1995); Eagleton, supra note 96, at 3. Senator Eagleton went to
work drafting such a bill with the help of Senators Jacob Javits and John Stennis. Eagleton,
supra note 96, at 3. Senator Javits thought it "essential that we devise a national means to
prevent other Vietnams [from occurring], and no one has a higher stake in this task than
the President of the United States." S. 2956. In his statements on the floor of Congress,
Senator Javits argued in the long term and the short:
We live in an age of undeclared war, which has meant
Presidential war. Prolonged engagement in undeclared, Presidential
war has created a most dangerous imbalance in our constitutional
system of checks and balances. That danger now permeates the
political climate beyond the immediate issue of the war per se.
97

PRESIDENCY:

[The Resolution is] a crucial first step in reestablishing the
constitutional balance so essential to the survival and proper
functioning of our democratic political system.
Id. at 128-29; see also HOxIE, supra, at 270; Eagleton, supra, note 96, at 2-6. War power
scholars David Gray Adler and Louis Fisher point out,
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is generally considered the
high-water mark of congressional reassertion in national security
affairs. In fact, it was ill conceived and badly compromised from the
start, replete with tortured ambiguity and self-contradiction. The net
result was to legalize a scope for independent presidential power that
would have astonished the Framers, who vested the power to initiate
hostilities exclusively in Congress. The resolution, however, grants to
the president unbridled discretion to go to war as he deems necessary
against anyone, anytime, anywhere, for at least ninety days. As
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has observed, before "the passage of the
resolution, unilateral presidential war was a matter of usurpation.
Now at least for the first ninety days, it was a matter of law."
David Gray Adler & Louis Fisher, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL.
SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1998).
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immediate attention. 98 The bill passed the Senate with relative ease, but
it emerged from the House with several differences and required
compromises in order to produce a passable bill. 99 President Richard
Nixon vetoed Congress' resolution upon passage, labeling it an
unconstitutional intrusion into presidential authority and an action that
would seriously undermine the Nation's ability to act decisively and
convincingly in times of international crisis.100 President Nixon also
vetoed the legislation because he felt it was unconstitutional to use a
statute to fix the procedure by which President and Congress share the
war powers. 10 1 Congress mustered the two-thirds vote to override his
10 2
veto, and the bill became law.
In addition to the law's obvious impact on the war powers, the
contemporary political benefits to an override were strong.10 3 Some
members of Congress feared that a vote to sustain would lend credence
to President Nixon's claims of presidential power, while others thought
that an override might be a step towards impeaching him.1 °4 The

These excepted situations were self-defense,
98 Eagleton, supra note 96, at 4.
forestallment of an attack, and rescue of American citizens or property. Id.
99 Id. Senator Eagleton read the House bill as stating that, "in war, the President alone
knows best." Id. Senators Eagleton and Javits even used the term "bastardized" to
describe the disservice done to their vision. Id. Senator Eagleton even voted against
Congress' final version of the bill; he considered it to be "untenable and even
unconstitutional in its attempt to give the President the sole power to wage war." Id. at 4-5.
100 Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893-94 (Oct. 24, 1973) [hereinafter Veto
Statement] (arguing that Congress should be required to act affirmatively and that the
Resolution undermines the nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in a crisis); see
also BURNS, supra note 50, at 186.
101 Veto Statement, supra note 100, at 893-94 (arguing that "the only way in which the
constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the
Constitution"); Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 2.
102 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§
1541-48 (2000)).
103 See generally FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 130-31; Adler & Fisher, supra note
97, at 2. For example, fifteen Congressmen voted against the House bill and the conference
language because it gave the President too much power, yet they voted to override it in
part because a nonoverriding vote could be seen as supporting the claims of President
Nixon. FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 130. To some, the law represented "efforts to
score some short-term political points at the cost of long-term institutional and
constitutional interests." Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 2.
104 Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 2. For example, Representative Bella Abzug, a
Democrat from New York, voted against the House bill and the conference version because
she rightly saw that they expanded presidential war power. Id. Yet, she was vehement in

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol37/iss2/5

Miksha: Declaring War on the War Powers Resolution

2003]

Declaring War

671

political atmosphere in which this legislation passed was perhaps the
most tumultuous in decades because of the Watergate scandal and the
social repercussions of Vietnam. 105
2.

The Provisions

As enacted, the War Powers Resolution ("Resolution") has four
crucial elements in its construction of the war powers procedure.' 06 First,

her support of a veto override stating, "This could be a turning point in the struggle to
control an administration that has run amuck. It could accelerate the demand for the
impeachment of the President." Id.
105
Id. at 4-5. Vice President Spiro Agnew had resigned only two weeks prior to Nixon's
veto. Id. The Saturday Night Massacre, as it has come to be called, which sent many of the
key Watergate players out of the government, occurred just four days before the veto. Id.
The Saturday Night Massacre was one part of Watergate in which President Nixon
dismissed Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, Attorney General Elliot Richardson, and
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus. FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 130.
Despite the pressures of party politics, several House Democrats recognized that the
Resolution codified a balance of power not contemplated in the Constitution. Adler &
Fisher, supra note 97, at 5. Vernon Thomson of Wisconsin had no illusions about the bill:
"The clear meaning of the words certainly points to a diminution rather than an
enhancement of the role of Congress in the critical decisions whether the country will or
will not go to war."
Id. "Bob Eckhardt of Texas condemned the abdication of
congressional power .... [He stated,] 'the Congress provides the color of authority to the
President to exercise a war-making power which I find the Constitution has exclusively
assigned to the Congress.'" Id. Senator Eagleton, who was a primary sponsor of the
Senate's version, which was stronger in that it required the President to pull out the forces
after a thirty-day period, denounced the bill that emerged from conference as a "total,
complete distortion of the war powers concept." Id. As Senator Eagleton so eloquently put
it, the War Powers Resolution, after being so nobly conceived, "has been horribly
bastardized to the point of being a menace." Id. "Rather than encourage congressional
participation, the resolution's flaws ensure that presidents will make important decisions
by themselves." DENISE M. BOSTDORFF, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE RHETORIC OF FOREIGN
CRISIS 141 (1994).
106 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000). The War Powers Resolution, as codified, provides, in
pertinent part:
§ 1541. Purpose And Policy
(a) Congressional declaration
It is the purpose of this chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers
of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces
in hostilities or in such situations.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2003], Art. 5

672

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol.37

(b) Congressional legislative power under necessary and proper
clause
Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically
provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own
powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.
(c)
Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief;
limitation
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.
Id. § 1541.
§ 1542. Consultation; initial and regular consultations
The President in every possible instance shall consult with
Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United
States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been
removed from such situations.
Id. § 1542.
§ 1543. Reporting requirement
(a)
written report; time of submission; circumstances
necessitating submission; information reported
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United
States Armed Forces are introduced(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a
report, in writing, setting forth(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which
such introduction took place; and
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(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
(b) Other information reported
The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to
the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Periodic reports; semiannual requirement
Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this
section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be
engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress
periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on
the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event
shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.
Id. § 1543.
§ 1544. Congressional action
(a)
Transmittal of report and referral to Congressional
committees; joint request for convening Congress
Each report submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title
shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar
day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the
report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has
adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent
of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the
President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report
and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
(b)
Termination of use of United States Armed Forces;
exceptions; extension period
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title,
whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United
States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted
(or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war
or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the
United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more
than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies
to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the
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the Resolution explains that the purpose of the statute was to satisfy the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution in questions of the introduction
of armed forces into hostilities through a system of collective judgment
by the Congress and the President.1 07 Further, the President may only
introduce armed forces into hostilities pursuant to a declaration of war,
specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency caused by an
attack upon the United States. 108
Second, the Resolution requires the President "in every possible
instance" to consult with Congress before introducing armed forces into
hostilities. 109 This consultation is to continue regularly throughout the
operation until the armed forces are no longer engaged or have been
removed from the theater of operations. u0
Third, the President must submit a report to Congress within fortyeight hours of deploying troops absent a congressional declaration of
war."1
The report must describe the circumstantial necessities,
authority, scope, and duration of the hostilities.11 2 Congress may also
request additional information from the President. 113 The President

continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Concurrent resolution for removal by President of United
States Armed Forces
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this subsection, at any time
that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a
declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall
be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.
Id. § 1544. Hereafter, citation to the Resolution is directed to the U.S.C., but common
practice uses the Resolution's uncodified section numbering, which is what will be used in
the textual references.
107
Id. § 1541(a). Throughout the text, "into hostilities" is shored up with "situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicate[d] by the circumstances." Id.
108
Id. § 1541(c). For the purposes of the statute, the United States also includes its
territories or possessions and the armed forces themselves. Id.
109
Id.§ 1542.
110

Id.

ill

Id. § 1543(a).

112

Id.

113

Id. § 1543(b).
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must also continue to periodically report to Congress on the status,
114
scope, and duration of the hostile situation.
Fourth, the Resolution limits the duration of unapproved hostilities
to sixty days.115 Approval comes in only four forms: a declaration of
war by Congress, specific authorization for that use of the armed forces,
a law extending the sixty-day period, or circumstances of an armed
attack upon the United States making termination physically
impossible.116 However, the sixty-day period could be extended for up
to thirty additional days upon the President's determination of
unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of the armed
forces. 117 In addition, Congress may direct the President to remove
armed forces by concurrent resolution. 18 Regardless of the Resolution's
attempted construction of a fail-safe and proper system, the application
and procedures raise constitutional questions. 119
Il.THE INFIRMITIES

OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Given almost thirty years of history, the War Powers Resolution has
been criticized as a dead letter and a total failure. 120 Not only has the
Resolution been a total failure in fulfilling its stated purposes, but the

Id. § 1543(c). The President must report no less often than once every six months. Id.
Id. § 1544(b).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118 Id. § 1544(c). However, this provision causes major constitutional issues addressed in
INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (holding that only joint resolutions or bills can have
legal effect). This Note does not address these concerns as it focuses on more fatal errors of
construction.
119
See infra Part III.
120 Eagleton, supra note 96, at 5; Yoo, supra note 64, at 1674. Former Senator Eagleton, a
drafter of the original bill, wrote, "In my judgment, the existing War Powers Resolution is
an unworkable mess. All recent presidents insist that warmaking is their decision and their
decision alone. Future presidents will undoubtedly take the same approach." Eagleton,
supra note 96, at 6. Geoffrey S. Corn explains that an "[a]naylsis of the actual operation of
the Resolution in relation to these various combat operations reveals a consistent pattern of
executive side-stepping, legislative acquiescence, and judicial abstention." Geoffrey S. Corn,
Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1149, 1152 (2001) (emphasis added).
114
115
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Resolution also suffers from inherent constitutional failings. 121 This Note
argues that these ills result from several factors.
First, the Resolution fails to meet the demands of the Constitution
because it designs a new system of war powers inconsistent with
principles of separation of powers and accountability. 122 Second, the
Resolution has been a total failure due to its weak construction of
enforcement mechanisms.123 Third, the necessities of military command
and execution require a more strict and swift system.124 This Note
further argues that the solution to the Resolution's ills and to the
necessities of American civilian-military decision-making is a
25
constitutional amendment.
A.

ConstitutionalConcerns

Although the Resolution began with genuine and virtuous
aspirations, it created a system of powers inconsistent with the
Constitution in several ways. The Resolution sought to rearrange the
separation of the powers held by two major institutions of American
government in which the third branch of government has remained
reticent regarding this breach of constitutional principles. 126 The
Resolution also defies the constitutional value of discourse and
127
accountability by allowing the President to act unilaterally.
1.

Separation of Powers and Delegation

The Constitution is the document that established the separation of
powers and the structure of the federal government. 128 The Resolution
reconceived one part of the separation of powers through a simple act of

121 See supra text accompanying note 107 for the Resolution's stated purpose. See also
infra Part III.A.
12 See infra Part III.A.
123 See infra Part III.B.
124

See infra Part III.C.

125 See infra Part IV.
126 See supra Part II.
127

See infra Part III.A.2.

128 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in Congress); id. art II, § 1
(vesting the executive power in the President); id. art 1II, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in
the Supreme Court and inferior courts).
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Congress. 129 The reconception was improper because it was inconsistent
with principles set forth explicitly in the document and with the
principle of delegation of power. On the other hand, a constitutional
amendment is appropriate because its subject is the determination of the
separation of powers, and it sets the rights and responsibilities of the
branches in relation to each other. An amendment would help to
solidify the limits and responsibilities of the branches of government in a
manner consistent with the Constitution itself.
a.

General Constitutional Construction

The Constitution gives to Congress the enumerated power to declare
war and to the President the power and responsibility to conduct those
operations as Commander in Chief.130 The Framers' make/declare
debate shows that they wished Congress to hold the power to initiate
hostilities. 131 The early courts were also clear that the President's role
1 32
was the prosecution of war.
The Resolution allows the President to initiate hostilities in some
circumstances, but the Resolution's permission is too broad to be
considered a declaration because it does not contemplate an actual
situation facing the United States. 133 Thus, by granting the President this
power, the Resolution rewrites the separation of powers as conceived by
the Constitution. Such a rewrite may not be conducted in violation of
the principles laid forth in the Constitution because the Supremacy

129

See supraPart II.D.2.

130 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; supra Part II.A.

See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text; supraPart lI.B.
United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895). The Court ruled that the
Commander-in-Chief Clause granted the President "such supreme and undivided
command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a successful war." Id. The language
here is quite revealing considering the use of the terms prosecution and war. Prosecution is
an activity taken within a situation and not simply the initiation of activity. Instead, war is
a pre-existing state within which the President commands the armed forces. See
DICTIONARY 1996, supra note 40, at 2012 (defining "war" as "a state of open, armed, often
prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties").
133 See BOUVIER, supra note 42 (defining declaration of war as an action taken regarding
another nation).
131
132
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Clause states that federal laws must be made in accordance with the
Constitution.M
Some commentators, however, argue that the Framers purposely left
the war powers in a cloudy, uncertain arrangement.1 35 It is hard to think
that the Framers left this great potential for tyranny and abuse to a
purely political process without guidance as to how the balance was to
be stricken. 136 Some scholars also argue that the power of the purse was
a sufficient check on the President; however, this contention is not valid
today. 137 Congressional implied consent, which is argued to flow from
the unused power of the purse, cannot be constitutionally sufficient
either, although it may be supported by recent history.138 The Supreme
Court has only upheld a claim of implied consent in cases involving a
proper delegation of power, and the Resolution does not represent a
proper delegation. 139

See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
135 See John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (1999). Professor Yoo points to the lack of explicit language in the
Constitution. Yoo, supra note 64, at 1688 (arguing that the "Framers did not intend the
Constitution to establish a single, correct method for going to war"). Yoo argues that, "if
the Framers had intended the Constitution to impose the strict process demanded by most
foreign affairs scholars, they would have employed the more detailed mechanisms and
language that they used elsewhere." Id. Specifically, the make/declare dichotomy meant
that the Framers understood broader powers to exist and insisted on limiting Congress'
power to only declaration. Id. at 1694. Since "engage" is used in article I, section 10, Yoo
argues that the Framers would not have used "declare" in section 8. Id. at 1690. This
argument is set in the context that "declare" only acted to set the international legal status
of nations, rather than the commencement of hostilities. Id. at 1690-91.
136 See supra Part II.A. Thomas Jefferson "opposed the right of the Presi[dent] to declare
anything future on the qu[estion] shall there or shall there not be war? & that no such thing
was intended." THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE ANAS (Nov. 8, 1793), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 95 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
137 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 1705; infra Part III.C. Yoo argues that a refusal to fund
military operations would be a legitimate recourse and ample authority for Congress to
check the President. Yoo, supranote 64, at 1675.
138 Corn, supra note 120, at 1167. Major Corn sees congressional inertia and past practices
as standing for the principle that Congress' inaction is acquiescence. Id. at 1158-62.
139 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); infra Part III.A.l.b-c.
134
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Improper Delegation of Power

Congress may delegate limited powers that it has been given by the
Constitution. 140 The courts have become increasingly willing to uphold
delegation against constitutional attack, especially when foreign affairs
issues are involved.' 4' In accordance with the Star-kist Foods test for
proper delegation of power, Congress must provide (1) an "intelligible
principle" for the executive to follow, (2) a specific policy or objective,
and (3) limits circumscribing that power.142 One may argue that the War
Powers Resolution fit these requirements fully and represented a proper
delegation of power. However, based on the historical and political
developments, a closer legal analysis reveals that the Resolution was not
a proper delegation.
The War Powers Resolution states a purpose and policy but does not
provide any guidance as to when the President may introduce forces into
hostilities. 43 Section 2(a) of the Resolution states the purpose as an effort
to "fulfill the intent of the Framers of the Constitution" and "insure that
the collective judgment of both Congress and the President will apply to
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities." 1"
Although the purpose is allegedly to guarantee the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President, the provisions of the War
145
Powers Resolution are very weak.
Section 2(b) states that Congress has the power to make all laws
necessary and proper for carrying into execution its own powers and all
other constitutional powers.146 However, Congress may not wholly
delegate legislative powers. 147 The courts have allowed Congress some

140
141
142
and
143

See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (upholding the Iranian hostage financial settlement).
See Star-kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A 1959); supra notes 53-59
accompanying text.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000). See supranote 106 for the language of § 1541.

144 Id. § 1541(a).

145 See, e.g., id. § 1542. This section provides that the President "in every possible instance
shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities."
Id. (emphasis added).
146 Id. § 1541(b).
147 See infra Part III.A.1.c.
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leeway in this area, but only where Congress has provided sufficient
guidance that the President is not working in a vacuum.
Section 2(c) states that the President may only act pursuant to a
declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national
emergency created by an attack upon the United States. 148 This section
approaches the sort of guidance that the courts have contemplated;
however, this construction relies on specific congressional action in two
situations and an attack upon the United States in the third. 149 Given the
post-Resolution activities of the President, this paragraph seems to have
had no import to the Executive. 50 Thus, through the Resolution's
application, presidents have failed to comply with this section by
claiming a general unilateral right to take action.
Through these provisions, the Resolution does not create an
"intelligible principle" by which the President is guided to decide
whether to introduce forces. The President has unbridled discretion. In
addition, apart from the three specific situations described in section 2(c),
the statute lacks a policy for when the President may act. The only
prong of the Star-kist Foods test that may actually be satisfied by the
Resolution is the limit on the power delegated because the President is
allowed to act only within certain but broad circumstances. However,
the Resolution does not suggest to the President how he or she must
make the determination to introduce armed forces into hostilities. A
proper delegation of power requires no less.
c.

Impossible Delegation of Legislative Power

Nevertheless, Congress generally lacks the constitutional ability to
delegate legislative powers.'l5 Article I of the Constitution makes it clear
that all enumerated legislative powers are vested in Congress.1 52 In 1892,
the Supreme Court recognized the principle that Congress cannot

148 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
149

See id.

150 See infra notes 173, 177, 185 and accompanying text.
151

See also supra note 23.

152 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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constitutionally delegate legislative power to the President. 15 3 As
recently as 1989, the Court reaffirmed that mandate. 5 4 The war powers
55
are indeed legislative powers and may not be delegated in whole.
However, the courts have allowed Congress to delegate purely
legislative powers under some circumstances, such as the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, but those delegations involved only a part of the
legislative power as Congress merely used the agencies to work out the
minute details.15 6 This is not the case with the Resolution because
Congress neither provided clear guidance nor limited the actual role of
the subordinate.
d. The Courts
The courts have been very reserved in foreign affairs matters, but an
amendment may make the interpretation of war powers a clear
constitutional issue requiring the Supreme Court's analysis. The courts
have avoided adjudication of disputes arising under the War Powers
Resolution because of the justiciability doctrines of impasse, ripeness,
157
standing, and political question.

153 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). "[That] Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is . . . universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." Id.
154 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989). The Court reaffirmed that the
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the separation of powers and that Congress may not
generally delegate its legislative power to another branch. Id. Congress, the Court held,
may seek the assistance of another branch, but the character of the "'assistance must be
fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government coordination.'" Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928)).
155 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
156 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000) (giving the Sentencing Commission the power to
create guidelines in accordance with many rules and policies). "Congress, for example, has
created a federal Sentencing Commission, giving it the power to create Guidelines that
(within the sentencing range set by individual statutes) reflect the host of factors that might
be used to determine the actual sentence imposed for each individual crime." Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 560 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157 See generally Cox, supra note 6, at 347 (discussing the exceedingly difficult invocation
of judical remedies under the Resolution); Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Holds That Members Of
Congress May Not Challenge the President's Use of Troops in Kosovo-Campbell v. Clinton, 113
HARv. L. REv. 2134 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell Challenge] (discussing in detail the
procedural and substantive history behind the challenge).
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One case arose when twenty-six members of Congress took their
war-power grievances to court in 1999.158 The suit was promptly
dismissed for a lack of standing for two reasons. The President's actions
had not invalidated Congress' votes or powers, and the case was
essentially a taxpayer suit on behalf of Congress that had not been
authorized by that body. 159 Upon appeal, the circuit court affirmed,
applying an exception that legislators could only challenge executive
action if they had no legislative power to prevent or counter it.160 This
analysis, however, burdens Congress too heavily because of the nature
of the war powers. That is, the difficult and tumultuous debate the
Framers treasured must be struck in a constitutionally satisfying manner,
which the Resolution simply does not represent. 161 Congress having the
power and ability to counter the President is exactly the point of the war
powers controversy. The courts could be in the position to help resolve
this aged issue, but they have successfully avoided the issue by using
nonjusticiability and standing analyses rather than looking to the
Constitution for ultimate guidance. 162 The absence of vigorous discourse
and discussion is a problem regarding not only court oversight but also
the decisions to introduce armed forces into hostilities.
2.

Discourse and Accountability

The courts have not yet intervened substantively because of
justiciability issues, and the prized problem of difficult deliberation

15 Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999). The members of Congress
sought a declaratory judgment that President Clinton had violated the War Powers
Resolution and the war powers under the Constitution through his actions in Kosovo. Id.
at 34-35.
159 Id. at 45 ("Absent a clear impasse between the executive and legislative branches,
resort to the judicial branch is inappropriate."). The court reasoned that Congress' votes
had not been invalidated because the members of Congress failed to show that the
President contravened clear language supported by a majority. Id. at 43-45.
160 Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 22-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For a more in-depth analysis
of Campbell in relation to standing, see Mark B. Stem, War Powers Revisited Congress,
Standing and the War Powers Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 205 (2001).
161 See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text; supra Part III.A.l.a.
162 See Campbell Challenge, supra note 157, at 2139. "[Plolitical branches' negotiations
over the proper separation of powers will suffer from each side's tendency to believe itself
unequivocally in the right." Id. at 2134.
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leaves Congress in a challenging position.163 This position, however, is
an important element in accountability. 164 Congress' involvement helps
to foster the legitimacy and trust in the righteousness (if it's possible) of
military actions. 165 It is unsettling to reflect that the Resolution was
actually only agreed to by one branch of our tripartite federal
government.1 66 Also, the division of the pro-executive and prolegislative factions in the government have been predictably political
since 1973, but this appears to be an unavoidable by-product of the
167
American system of government.

See supra Part III.A.l.d.
It is a prized problem because the discourse of our
representatives demonstrates, supports, and proves our republic's vitality.
164 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (relating the activities of factions
as the healthy and effective means by which just government may be conducted).
165 See Hutchison, supra note 20, at 380 (arguing that Congress being involved helps
accountability).
16 See supra Part II.D.1 (pointing out the political atmosphere and process by which the
Resolution came about, which involved an override of President Nixon's veto).
167 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 1684. Professor Yoo explains,
[I]t seems that the modern practice of warmaking has freed itself from
the partisanship that afflicted earlier struggles over foreign policy.
Before the Clinton administration, war power disputes invariably
assumed party lines, with Republicans defending executive power and
Democrats asserting that all hostilities required legislative
authorization. Republicans controlled the executive branch for all but
four of the twenty-four years between the presidencies of Johnson and
Clinton, while Democrats controlled the majority of the House for that
entire period. After President Clinton's two victories in 1992 and 1996,
however, Democrats in Congress have lost their fire on the war powers
issue. It is astonishing how Democratic congressmen who vociferously
attacked aid to El Salvador, escorting oil tankers in the Persian Gulf, or
the Grenada, Panama, and Persian Gulf Wars have been so obviously
inconsistent toward the Clinton administration. Other Democrats in
the executive branch defend presidential war powers with all of the
fervor of their Republican predecessors. The only governmental critics
of the modem system of war powers-and they seem to be a relatively
small group-are Republican congressmen who began service after the
1994 elections, and thus are not bound by earlier statements on war
powers under Republican presidents.
Id. It should be noted, however, that the critical Republicans would be naturally critical of
the Democratic President. See id.
163
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The Resolution's Failings in Implementation

Possibly the greatest problem with the Resolution is Congress'
inability to enforce compliance. 168
The Resolution is essentially
toothless. 169 Its cornerstone of express congressional authorization has
been virtually meaningless. 70 Lawmakers have asserted that Congress is
effectively powerless because the revocation of funding is ineffective
once troops are on the ground.' 71 As such, the application of the
Resolution has been disappointing in terms of the Resolution's policies
and purposes.172 Every President since 1973 has initiated some military
hostilities. 173 A recent Congressional Research Service Report identified

168 Id. at 1677 ("Presidents have never acknowledged the [War Powers Resolution's]
constitutionality, and their recent actions have ignored its terms."). See generally supra Part
II.D.2 (explaining the requirements of the Resolution on the actions of the President and
Congress).
169 Gerald G. Howard, Combat In Kosovo: Ignoring The War Powers Resolution, 38 Hous. L.
REv. 261, 293 (2001). Howard argues that it is "clear that the War Powers Resolution is
effectively toothless when the President chooses to ignore it. It must be revised in order to
assuage continuing public and political anxiety over the power of the Executive branch to
immerse the nation in war." Id. But see 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (2000) (stating that Congress
may direct the President by concurrent resolution to withdraw forces engaged in situations
absent the declaration of war or statutory authorization). However, recourse to concurrent
resolution may be unusable after INS v. Chadha,462 U.S. 919 (1983). See supranote 118 and
accompanying text.
170 Corn, supra note 120, at 1152. The Clinton Administration, for example, based its
interpretation of the Resolution upon the legal work of Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger. Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 11. Dellinger claimed that the statute
"recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral presidential authority to deploy
armed forces 'into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances."' Id. The words chosen by Dellinger, recognize and
presuppose, carry an immodest tone that seems to be in direct conflict with the language of
the Resolution itself. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000) (stating the Resolution's purpose, i.e., to
insure that the decision to lead American armed forces into combat would be a shared
decision).
171 See Hutchison, supra note 20, at 380 (pointing out that the "Congress has few tools to
check [a president's] excesses"); supra Part III.C.
172 See Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 10 (concluding that Congress is being
progressively marginalized).
173 See id. President Ford used military forces as part of the evacuations from Southeast
Asia and during the Mayagiiez incident during which he ordered air strikes and land forces
into Cambodia without consulting Congress. FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 136-38.
The Mayagiiez incident was the first combat operation since the passage of the Resolution
and followed the capture of a U.S. merchant ship by Cambodians. HOXIE, supra note 97, at
270. President Ford did fulfill the requirement of a written report to Congress within fortyeight hours. Id. President Carter used military force in the attempted rescue of hostages in
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ninety-two specific instances that have been reported under the
Resolution along with a lengthy list of actions taken in hostile or
potentially hostile areas abroad. 174 Although section 2(c) creates
prerequisites for presidential action, Congress has not responded to
violations of the law in any clear form.175 The consultation requirement
176
has not been enforced either.
Interpretation of a collection of congressional actions regarding a
particular situation becomes quite unclear when taken together. For
example, the 106th Congress' set of bills regarding President Clinton's
actions in Kosovo left much to be desired in the way of clear

Iran. FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 139-40. President Reagan authorized the action
in Lebanon, the Grenadine invasion, and Libyan air strikes. Id. at 140-44. In fact, the
actions in Lebanon led to the first invocation of the War Powers Resolution by Congress
because President Reagan sent troops into Lebanon without consulting or reporting. See id.
at 140; Howard, supra note 169, at 277. The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution
("MFLR") constituted the specific statutory authorization contemplated in section 2(c) of
the Resolution, included very specific end times, and was, on the whole, a very specific
authorization of deployment. See Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983); Howard, supra
note 169, at 277-78. President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada, a Caribbean island,
after a coup broke out there only two days after a terrorist act in Lebanon killed 241
American soldiers. See FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 141-42. President Reagan
ordered air strikes against Libya following several attacks on U.S. naval aircraft and ships
and an act of terrorism in Germany that caused about fifty casualties. See id. at 142-44.
President Bush used the Resolution in what later became the Gulf War in 1991, and he also
was involved with Panama and other Latin American strikes. See id. at 144-48; Howard,
supra note 169, at 278. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
was a much less constrictive authorization than the MFLR authorization eight years earlier.
See Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991). For examples of President Clinton's uses of force,
see notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
174 Richard F. Grimmett, The War Powers Resolution:After Twenty-Eight Years, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, CRS WEB 53-69, at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7655.pdf
(last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
175 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (mandating that the President may only act pursuant to a
declaration of war, specific statuary authorization, or an attack on the United States). Most
responses come in the form of suits such as Campbell and perennial bills to repeal the
Resolution; both forms of response continue to fail. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999); H.R.J. Res. 27, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing to repeal the
Resolution, disallow funding of unauthorized uses of armed forces, and create standing for
cases arising under the bill); H.R. Res. 474, 107th Cong. (2001) (proposing to repeal the
Resolution).
176 See 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000) (stating that the President shall consult with Congress in
every possible instance before introducing troops); supra note 173 (pointing out several
situations in which consultation was neither sought nor received by Congress).
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congressional intent.17 Thirty-six days into Operation Allied Force, the
House took up four bills regarding Kosovo. 78 The first, which happened
to pass, prohibited Department of Defense expenditures for ground
forces in Kosovo without specific congressional authorization. 179 The
second contemplated a section 5(c) removal via concurrent resolution,
but this effort failed.1 80 The third contemplated an actual declaration of
war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but this was also

See Howard, supra note 169, at 263-68 (discussing the history and process involved in
Kosovo). In connection with other continuing conflicts in the Balkan region, the war in
Kosovo became the next hotspot for American forces in the region. See id.; Charles Tiefer,
War Decisions in the Late 1990s by PartialCongressionalDeclaration,36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 916 (1999) (discussing the earlier intervention in Bosnia starting in 1995 involving 20,000 U.S.
troops). On March 11, 1999, the House of Representatives passed a resolution authorizing
the President to deploy forces to be used in peacekeeping once a peace agreement was
reached. H.R. Con. Res. 42, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H1214-15 (1999). However, no
such agreement was on the immediate horizon. In fact, on March 23, the Senate passed a
simple resolution authorizing air and missile strikes, but the House did not follow suit.
S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. S3110, S3118 (1999); see Howard, supra note
169, at 285. The very next day, President Clinton ordered air strikes to begin against
Serbian targets in response to continuing atrocities. See Campbell Challenge, supra note 157,
at 2134; Yoo, supra note 64, at 1673. The campaign, Operation Allied Force, involved over
20,000 troops. See H.R. Res. 130, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H1660 (1999); Corn, supra
note 120, at 1149; Yoo, supra note 64, at 1673. On the day the combat began, the House
voted on House Resolution 130, which could have authorized combat operations but
instead only expressed support for service members. H.R. Res. 130, 106th Cong., 145
CONG. REC. H1660 (1999) ("That the House of Representatives supports the members of the
United States Armed Forces who are engaged in military operations against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and recognizes their professionalism, dedication, patriotism, and
courage."). Next, in an attempt to comply with the third element of the War Powers
Resolution, President Clinton submitted a letter to Congress documenting his actions.
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 527, 528 (Mar. 29, 1999). However, the letter was
a few days late, and the authority cited was ambiguous. See id. President Clinton stated
that he took "these actions pursuant to [his] constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign
relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. In doing so, [he took] into
account the views and support expressed by the Congress in S. Con. Res. 21 and H. Con.
Res. 42." Id. However, Resolution 42 was an authorization only for deployment for
peacekeeping and not combat. See H.R. Con. Res. 42. The bombing continued through the
next round of congressional antics. See Yoo, supranote 64, at 1680-82.
178
See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
179 H.R. 1569, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REG. H2400 (1999) (passing by a vote of 249 to 180).
190 H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REG. H2414 (1999) (failing by a vote of 139
to 290); see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
177
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resoundingly defeated. 181 Finally, the House took up a Senate bill that
had been one of President Clinton's cited authorities since it allowed for
air strikes, but the House action failed through a tie. 8 2 These votes do
not create any coherent sense of what the House intended with respect to
Kosovo. 183 There was no declaration of war nor was there any claim of
an attack on U.S. personnel or property. 184 The claim that any of the
preceding resolutions constituted "specific statutory authorization" also
seems unfounded since the closest expression was the Senate Concurrent
Resolution 21, which did not even pass in the House. 85

181

H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REc. H2427, H2440 (1999) (failing by a vote of
427 to 2).
182 S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H2441, H2451-52 (1999) (failing by a vote
of 213 to 213).
183 See S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. H2456 (1999). Congressman Dave
Obey criticized his colleagues:
[T]his Congress could not have been more irresponsible in the way it
has dealt with the issue in Kosovo if it had taken lessons.
Never, never in the 30 years that I have served here have I seen
less vision. Never have I seen less leadership. Never have I seen more
confusion. And never have I seen the national interest being left in the
dust the way it is tonight.
Id. Making the issue even more muddled, on May 20, 1999, Congress increased the
Administration's request for emergency funding for Operation Allied Force, but it did not
authorize the war in explicit terms. 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-31, § 2002, 113 Stat. 57 (1999). The bombing ended on June 10, 1999, a full
seventy-nine days after it began, with the entrance of almost 7000 ground troops under the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's flag. Yoo, supra note 64, at 1682 (arguing that the
Kosovo conflict "highlighted the War Powers Resolution's impotence in constraining
presidential decision-making"). In addition, President Clinton did not comply with the
sixty-day requirement, and Congress failed to press the issue. Howard, supra note 169, at
284.
184 See Howard, supranote 169, at 281-89.
185 See supra notes 177, 179-82 and accompanying text. Several other of President
Clinton's actions also raise implications for an impact on the Resolution. For example, in
the 1998 strikes against sites in Iraq, the Sudan, and Afghanistan, no one in the Clinton
administration or Congress ever mentioned the Resolution or how it might relate to the
situation. Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 5; see Tiefer, supra note 177, at 8-9 (discussing the
1998 attacks on Iraq and Bosnia). The Administration did not even distribute a legal
analysis to justify the use of armed force. Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 10. In 1993,
President Clinton expanded the number and goals of 28,000 troops in Somalia that had
been originally deployed by President Bush for humanitarian reasons. Yoo, supra note 64,
at 1673. In November 1993, Congress authorized participation in the multinational force
although these forces had already been there for a year.
See An Act Making
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Two discordant and unfitting conclusions result: either Presidents
rely upon the Resolution but simply fail to abide by its requirements
with impunity, or the Resolution was an unconstitutional delegation of
power by Congress. In the former case, the President is not respecting
186
the laws of Congress, which is a violation of constitutional magnitude.
In the latter, the Resolution operates contrary to constitutional
specifications and must be changed.
C. The Implications of Modern Warfare
A third major problem with the Resolution is that the world is a very
different place than it was in 1973. The war powers construct needs to be
reconfigured for the post-Cold War era.187 The proliferation and
increased power of intergovernmental organizations and supra-national

Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30,
1994, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8151, 107 Stat. 1418 (1993); Howard,
supra note 169, at 279. Congress also declared policies for Somalian intervention and gave
President Clinton a deadline to remove the forces. See An Act to Authorize Appropriations
for Fiscal Year 1994 for Military Activities of the Department of Defense, for Military
Construction, and for Defense Activities of the Department of Energy, to Prescribe
Personnel Strengths for Such Fiscal Year for the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes,
Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 1512, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993). Interestingly, this bill did not become law
until after the deadline Congress set had already tolled. Id. Nothing ever came of the
deadline or Congress' mandates as President Clinton withdrew the forces after political
heat and combat casualties began to rise. See Yoo, supra note 64, at 1673. U.S. military
involvement in Haiti became an even more disappointing display of congressional
principles. Howard, supra note 169, at 281 (pointing out that Clinton should have
withdrawn forces from Haiti in accordance with the Resolution but that Congress chose not
to require him to do so, either). In 1994, 16,000 troops were sent into Haiti under the
backing of the United Nations to oversee the transition to democracy. Yoo, supra note 64, at
1673. The resulting legislation contained specific language supporting the "men and
women of the United States Armed Forces in Haiti," admonishing the President for not
seeking congressional approval, requesting a list of documents within seven days
resembling those required under section 3 of the Resolution, and avoiding the point of
whether the language itself constituted congressional approval or disapproval. Joint
Resolution Regarding United States Policy Toward Haiti, Pub. L. No. 103-423, 108 Stat 4358
(1994). Mixed signals and ambivalence thereafter became the Congress' modus operandi.
186 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 1673. "Aside from getting himself impeached but not
removed, [President Clinton's] most noteworthy impact on the Constitution has been in the
area of war powers." Id.
187 Tiefer, supra note 177, at 3 (arguing that the "war powers theory must catch up with
how the [recent conflicts] marked both the emergence of new issues in foreign affairs and
bases for military intervention").
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groups is only a small aspect of the change. 188 Warfare continues to
change; low-intensity conflicts and small-scale conventional wars have
become the norm of modem warfare. 189 Speed in decision-making is at a
premium because of advancements in communications, intelligence, and
warfare technology. 190 Not only have we benefited from two hundred
years of presidential-congressional controversies, but the United States is
also fighting wars in a much different manner. 191 Nevertheless, the
Constitution vests the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military
hostilities in Congress, regardless of the scope, size, or nature of the
conflict.192 The immediacy of contemporary warfare causes a heightened
scrutiny of the war powers too. Failed war powers discussions may, in
the end, cost lives and not just waste taxpayers' money as in other realms
93
of governmental debate.'
Contrary to some commentators, the power of the purse is not a
sufficient check on the President, nor does the funding of the military act

See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1227-28
(1999).
189 RICHARD A. PRESTON ET AL., MEN IN ARMS: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN SOcIETY 331-86 (1991). The epilogue offers a somewhat
prophetic synopsis of the world in the 1990s and early twenty-first century:
Low-intensity conflict shows no signs of abating. Indeed, the end
of the Cold War seems to have sparked a host of ethnic, regional,
religious, and cultural conflicts that have been simmering for decades
beneath constraints imposed by empire or by the Cold War itself....
The new technology of war places in terrorists' hands weapons far
more powerful than ever before.... It will be a dangerous world
indeed if they continue to view war as their only recourse.
Id. at 392.
188

190

Id. at 372-73.

See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. On February 19, 1998, when Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright spoke at Tennessee State University, she was asked how
President Clinton could order military action against Iraq after opposing American
intervention in Vietnam. Adler & Fisher, supra note 97, at 19-20. She replied, "We are
talking about using military force, but we are not talking about a war. That is an important
distinction." Id.
192
See supranotes 63-68 and accompanying text.
193 See Campbell Challenge, supra note 157, at 2138. This commentary points out that a
"failed budget negotiation means that until public pressure resolves an impasse,
nonessential government workers will stay home, which wastes money; a failed war
powers negotiation means that troops may be unwisely sent into or withdrawn from the
theater, which may cost lives." Id.
191
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as an implicit consent by Congress.194 One must account for the military
realities involved in refusing to fund on-going military operations. War,
at the time of the Framers, was much slower; wars lasted years and
involved troop movements and communications that were only as fast as
a horse or boat. 95 During that period, Congress' deliberative and
ensuing check of de-funding a military operation would not be militarily
frustrating because armies took so long to coordinate and move.196 Thus,
such a check could be sufficient and historically based, but time is of the
197
essence in today's world.
A constitutional amendment allows the government to realign the
powers through a process that respects the Constitution's timelessness
because the change would be sought and affected through proper
constitutional means. 198
IV. THE WAR POWERS

AMENDMENT

A. Introductory Remarks
The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is an unconstitutional
determination of the war powers. 99 This Part proposes an alternative in
the form of a constitutional amendment, the passage of which would

194 See Yoo, supra note 64, at 1699, 1705. Yoo argues that Kosovo was a case in which
Congress simply chose, as a political matter, not to refuse to fund the military operations.
Id. at 1675. A refusal to fund military operations, then, would be a legitimate recourse and
ample authority for Congress to check the President. Id.
195 See generally MLLLETr & MASLOWSKI, supra note 14, at 51-161 (describing the status,
conduct, and development of warfare during the American Revolution and the fifty years
following).
196 See id.

197 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
198 But see David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457 (2001). Strauss points out that presidential war powers have been broadened
without the use of constitutional amendments. Id. at 1471-72. However, this is a purely
positivist view and fails to consider the normative ramifications of the shift in the war
powers construct.
199 See supra Part III.A. In addition, the Resolution may be unconstitutional because it
constrains future Congresses in their means of support for the President. Corn, supra note
120, at 1155. The Ninety-third Congress seemed to want to solidify, for the rest of U.S.
constitutional history, the means by which the nation goes to war. See supra Part lI.D. This
does not seem to be constitutional itself because it affected such a long-standing and central
concern and function of the federal government without proceeding through the
Constitution's normal mechanisms for affecting such a broad change or statement.
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satisfy both the Constitution's substantive and procedural requirements.
The amendment process will encourage discourse because it is
protracted,
public,
intergovernmental,
and
intragovernmental.
Considering the interests in the balance, a devotion to the righteousness
of the process and to the justice of the solution requires nothing less.
Surprisingly, most commentators do not suggest a single remedy or
solution but only raise questions or possibilities. 200 The repeal of the
Resolution hardly seems to be a wise solution, at least by itself, because
the Resolution at least sets down some guidelines and a return to pre1973 jurisprudence would open up a chaotic situation in constitutional
law. 20' Serious ends require serious means, and there is no more serious
means than a constitutional amendment. 20 2 Simply put, the amendment

200 See FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 191-94 (suggesting many possible revisions
to the War Powers Resolution). Howard has surveyed the options and makes a good case
against inaction:
Options for legislative action range from repealing the War
Powers Resolution to strengthening its authority. The choice is not
clear. What is certain, however, is that failing to resolve the issue
could be disastrous the next time we face a national emergency. The
political events surrounding the commitment of American forces to
combat against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is indicative of a
fundamental breakdown in the allocation of duties and responsibilities
among branches of the federal government. We cannot accept laws
that "hog tie" the Commander-in-Chief in fulfilling his duties to
provide for the security of the nation while not also firmly charging
Congress to act. Similarly, we cannot accept blatant disregard for the
law by any branch of the government that may deem compliance
inconvenient. Finally, we cannot accept a judiciary that is unwilling to
enter the fray when there is a conflict between the executive and
legislative branches.
Howard, supra note 169, at 293. However, many amendments have been suggested over
the years by legislators themselves, but each succumbs to political pressures and fears. See
Grimmett, supra note 174, at 48-52. Grimmett summarizes many of the proposals, which
range from elimination of specific sections of the Resolution to judicial review. Id. A
handful of proposals have been similar to the one proposed here, but each lacked the
benefit of a streamlined, small body as the primary consultative group. See id. at 50-51.
201 See Howard, supra note 169, at 293. Howard points out that "to simply repeal [the
War Powers Resolution] without further action would be to catapult the United States back
to the mid-1900s, thus returning the nation to an era that allowed one elected official to
disregard hundreds of other elected representatives and embroil the nation in years of
unpopular war." Id.
202 See CARL VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR 86 (Vom Kriege trans., Michael Howard & Peter
Paret eds., Princeton University Press 1984) (1832). "War is no pastime; it is no mere joy in
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creates a clear method for the process that will be necessary before
introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.
B.

A Proposed Amendment 2°3
WAR POWERS.

SECTION 1. The President, before introducing armed forces into hostilities
abroad,shall obtain the consent of two-thirds of the CongressionalWar Council.
(a) The CongressionalWar Council.
(i) Membership.
(A) The Council shall be composed of the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate, the Senate Majority Leader, the Senate Minority
Leader, the Speaker of the House, the House Majority Leader,
and the House Minority Leader.
(B) Each Council member may appoint a proxy. Proxies may only
be members of the same House of Congress as the member
making the appointment. A Council member who wishes to
appoint a proxy must do so in writing and must certify such
writing to the President and the other Council members at a
time prior to the invocation of an action under this section.
The original Council member may rescind this appointment
using the same method.
(ii) The Council's deliberations, meetings, and communications made
pursuant to this section are not open to the public or press.
(iii) Consent may be manifested in writing, orally, or electronically.
(b) If consent has been granted, the President shall immediately call for
Congress to assemble.
(c) CongressionalAction.
(i) Congress shall assemble within twenty-four hoursfor this purpose
if not already in session.
(ii) Each House of Congress shall take up the question of the armed
forces in hostilities to determine the largest extent of the operations
and so decide by concurrent resolution. The determination must
contemplate the duration, mission, and theater of operations.
Congress shall produce a concurrent resolution within forty-eight

daring and winning, no place for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a
serious end." Id.
203
All text in italics and the subsequent commentary are the contribution of the author.
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hours and fulfill the requirements of this section. The President
must abide by the resolution'sdeterminations.
Commentary
Section 1 sets forth the process of introduction of armed forces into
hostilities abroad. By requiring the consent of the key leaders of
Congress, several interests are satisfied. 204 Congress has a necessary
voice in the decision, and a small group has the benefit of fast action. 205
A difficulty is the extent of that consent and its impact on the President's
actions. Key leaders who would have great authority in their respective
Houses of Congress make up the Congressional War Council. 206 In order
to preserve bicameralism, an equal number of members from each
House and the two-thirds majority requirement ensure that both Houses
of Congress would be represented in the positive consent. The proxy
clause would allow any of these members to appoint a member they feel
would be better suited to the position and responsibility. The reality of
communications technology today minimizes the threat to national
security caused by the delay of contacting six people. The secrecy of the
deliberations, meetings, and communications serves only to protect the
national security interests of forces involved in the potential action and
of American citizens abroad.

204 See Linn, supra note 30, at 749.
205 But see FISHER, WAR POWER, supra note 62, at 194. Fisher suggests a consultative group
of eighteen congressional members to be used in a revised Resolution scheme. Id. The
eighteen would expand the list proposed here to include the chairperson and ranking
members of the following committees: Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs,
Senate Armed Services, House Armed Services, Senate Intelligence, and House
Intelligence. Id. The amendment plan above should be preferred to Fisher's suggestion for
two reasons: size and function. Although communications and transportation are
undoubtedly faster, easier, and more secure than in the past, such an expansion to eighteen
defeats the purpose of utilizing a small group because of the speed at which the members
can be contacted, advised, implored, and consulted. The function of the Congressional
War Council would be to ensure that Congress had affirmative input into the process while
respecting the necessities of fast action because its consent would be necessary rather than
consultation.
206 See generally Hutchison, supra note 20. Senator Hutchison argues that "congressional
involvement in foreign affairs is not and should not be a partisan issue [because it is] an
institutional issue, critical to the future conduct of principled foreign policy." Id. at 380.
Certainly, politics is involved in all decisions in Washington, but these powers hold a
position that many wish would be conducted apolitically.
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Congress would then have the job of debating the issues in session,
which is a return to a deliberative system. The assemblage language
ensures that this issue is addressed in due time. The largest extent clause
does grant Congress some latitude in the restrictions to be placed on the
action. The elements of the determination resolution cover the when
("duration"); where ("theater of operations"); and the who, what, and why
("mission"). The how is up to the Commander in Chief.
Therefore, section 1 of the Amendment acts to remedy several of the
problems with the Resolution. First, the separation of powers problem is
disposed of by creating an explicit structure for the war powers through
the use of an amendment. 2 7 Second, the mandatory action by Congress
encourages discourse and debate. 2 8 Third, the Amendment uses
obligatory language at each stage of the process, giving it more teeth
than the Resolution. 20 9 Fourth, the seventy-two hour total maximum
210
time comports with the necessities of modem warfare.
SECTION 2. The President shall have the authority to repel an imminent
armed attack on the United States, its territories,possessions, and armedforces
located abroad. An operation arising under this section must then follow the
provisions of section 1(c) once the imminent threat to the United States, its
territories,possessions, and armedforces located abroadhas been quelled.

Commentary
Section 2 recognizes the President's necessary power as the overseer
of the United States and its interests. 211 As such, it reflects section 2(c) of
the Resolution. 212 This section, however, also adds language limiting the
scope of defensive actions so that they may not become wholly offensive
operations without the consideration of Congress. This section serves to

207
208

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supraPart III.A.2.

209 See supra Part III.B.
Conpare 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000) (requiring the President to consult
with Congress "in every possible instance"), with section 1 of the proposed Amendment
(requiring that the President "shall obtain.., consent" before taking action).
210 See supra Part III.C;
see also DoDIOI: An Introductory Overview of the Department of
Defense, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dodl01/dodl01.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2002) (stating that the U.S. Air Force is now "able to deliver forces
anywhere in the world in less than 48 hours").
211 See supraPart II.A.

212 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (2000).
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remedy the separation of powers problem by codifying custom and
213
traditional understandings while making the system clear in form.
SECTION 3. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriatelegislation.

Commentary
Section 3 allows Congress to create mechanisms to expedite
consultation, deliberation, and checks within the process. For example,
Congress could prohibit the use of funds by the Department of Defense
in actions that violate the Amendment. 214 This section serves to remedy
the separation of powers and the implementation problem by explicitly
allowing Congress to enforce the article with further legislative
mechanisms.
Overall, the proposed War Powers Amendment allows the President
to act quickly when necessary and ensures that the deliberative process
of our Nation's elected representatives would check those actions. At the
core of the war powers debate are the lives of the Nation's sons and
daughters and the memories of those who paid the ultimate price for the

See supra Parts II.B, III.A.1.
See H.R.J. Res. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill, currently sitting idle in several House
committees, proposes a repeal of the Resolution and a strong redrafting of the war powers.
See id. In pertinent part, the bill reads:
Sec. 4. Deployment of Armed Forces into Hostilities and Other Similar
Situations.
(a) Requirement.-Elements of the Armed Forces may be deployed into
hostilities outside the United States or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities outside the United States is clearly indicated
by the circumstances only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war under
article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, or (2) an attack upon the United
States or the territories or possessions of the United States.
(b) Prohibition on Use of Funds.-None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available to the Department of Defense may be
obligated or expended for the deployment of elements of the Armed
Forces in contravention of subsection (a).
Id. § 4. The bill also seeks to create standing to challenge presidential orders that violate the
re-written war powers. See id. § 5. However, under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a concrete
injury is required for suits against the government, and such an injury may not be easily
shown. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
213
214
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freedoms enjoyed by all U.S. citizens. 215 A great respect to those lives
and memories requires more than the War Powers Resolution offers.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Framers had a natural distrust of unitary power and sought to
diffuse the power amongst several actors for governmental authority
and decision-making; the war powers are no different. The design
adopted by the Framers was rooted in history, tradition, and American
principles of democracy, accountability, and checks and balances.
However, times do change, and warfare is certainly no exception. The
necessities of time and energy require must faster action than Congress
could ever be capable of as a whole. The President must be able to
defend the Nation and only be allowed to embroil the armed forces in
conflict with some authorization from the governed, as represented by
Congress. The War Powers Resolution, conceived in genuine and
virtuous aspirations, failed to ensure that the armed forces would have
two masters incapable of despotic preeminence. Only a constitutional
amendment conceived with the above values can hope to secure the
rights of the people with safety and respect.
EPILOGUE

The images of September 11, 2001, will haunt every American for the
rest of their lives. On that fateful day, nineteen terrorists working under
the guise of the al Qaeda terror network hijacked four commercial
airliners, crashing each one of them. Two struck the twin towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City, the third struck the United States
Department of Defense headquarters of the Pentagon in Arlington,
Virginia, and the fourth crashed into a wooded area in Pennsylvania.
Estimations in the loss of life total nearly four thousand citizens from
more than eighty nations, and the financial costs have been projected in
the tens of billions of dollars.

See Howard, supra note 169, at 295. Howard proclaims that a "return to the nebulous
processes that allowed the U.S. to become embroiled in the foreign and domestic fiasco that
was Vietnam would be a travesty. It is time to agree, document, comply, and move
forward-for the sake of the nation." Id.
215
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In the following days, the Bush Administration and the 107th
Congress discussed a military response. On September 14, Senate
Majority Leader Thomas Daschle introduced Senate Joint Resolution 23,
which later became Public Law 107-40.21 6 The bill moved extraordinarily
quickly and easily towards enactment. 217 The President signed the bill
into law four days later.218 The law authorized the President to use
broad military powers:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in
order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations,
219
organizations, or persons.
The law also made direct reference to the War Powers Resolution by
stating that this resolution would "constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of section 5(b)" but would not
supercede any requirement of that resolution.220
On September 20, the President publicly identified Saudi-born
Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network as the perpetrators
of this "act of war."2 1 He further explained that bin Laden was

216 Acts Approved by the President, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1355 (Sept. 24, 2001).
217 The bill was submitted to the Senate, considered, and agreed to without amendment
by a vote of 98-0. Upon submission to the House of Representatives, the bill passed that
same day by a vote of 420-1 with ten members not voting. 147 CONG. REC. S9421 (2001)
(detailing the vote on S.J. Res. 23 in the Senate). One of the nonvoting members of the
Senate was Senator Jesse Helms of South Carolina, who missed the vote because of a
"traffic jam" but would have voted for the resolution, which would bring the expressed
vote to 99-0. Id. 147 CONG. REc. H5683 (2001) (detailing the vote on S.J. Res. 23 in the
House). One of the nonvoting members of the House was Representative Thomas E. Petri
of Wisconsin, who missed the vote but would have voted for the resolution, which would
bring the expressed vote to 421-1. Id.
218 Acts Approved by the President, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1355 (Sept. 24, 2001).
219 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18,
2001).
220 Id.
221 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Unitd States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347, 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001).
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entangled in the country that gave him harbor, Afghanistan, and was
especially symbiotically supportive of the Taliban regime that governed
most of that nation-state. 222 After issuing an ultimatum to the Taliban
regime, President Bush called for hope and vigilance. 223 On September
24, President Bush reported to Congress that he was ordering additional
forces into the Central and Pacific Command areas of operations.224
The Taliban did not conform to President Bush's ultimatum, and, on
October 7, 2001, a military response, later termed Operation Enduring
Freedom, began as part of the multi-faceted War on Terrorism. 225 The
operations involved more than simply military forces and included
diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, investigative, and homeland
security means. 226 Two days later, the President again reported to
Congress in accordance with the War Powers Resolution and the
September 14 resolution. 227 The war continued in Afghanistan and led to
the toppling of the Taliban regime and re-institution of civil order. By
the State of the Union Address of 2002, liberated Afghanistan had an
interim leader, but the battle was not yet over. 228 President Bush sought
the elimination of the entire al Qaeda network, which was scattered in

President Bush explained, "Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is
not making money; its goal is remaking the world-and imposing its radical beliefs on
people everywhere." Id. at 1348. The President, before Congress, stated that this was the
second act of war on American soil in the 136 years since the Civil War. Id. at 1347.
M

Id. at 1348.

M See id. President Bush demanded the regime hand over the leaders of al Qaeda and
close all the terrorist sites. Id. This ultimatum stressed that the Taliban must act
immediately and cooperate, or "they will share in [the terrorists'] fate." Id. The public
policy provided that the United States "will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven
to terrorism .... Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the
United States as a hostile regime." Id. at 1349.
224 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of Forces in Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, id. 1372 (Sept. 24, 2001).
m Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and
Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, id. 1432, 1432 (Oct. 7, 2001).
226 Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Combat Action in Afghanistan Against
Al Qaida Terrorists and Their Taliban Supporters, id. 1447 (Oct. 9, 2001).
227 Id. at 1448.
228 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 38 id. 133,
133-34 (Jan. 29, 2002).
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the mountains of Afghanistan and throughout the globe.229 However,
the war in Afghanistan was only beginning, as President Bush saw the
entire world as a battlefield in the war against terror. 230 He also declared
that states, such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, constituted an "axis of
evil." 231 President Bush pointed out that Iraq had continued its hostile
232
posture toward America and had also continued a support of terror.
As the Afghan phase of Operation Enduring Freedom was winding
down, the overtures regarding Iraq and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
increased in intensity and frequency. By July of 2002, Congress was
233
holding hearings regarding Iraq.
As a military move against Iraq became more imminent, questions
began to arise regarding the legal basis for such an action. White House
Counsel Al Gonzalez argued that President Bush could order a military
action under three premises: (1) the U.S. Constitution gives the President
authority to wage war without explicit authorization from Congress; (2)
authorization still exists under the resolutions for the Gulf War in 1991;
or (3) reliance on the resolution of September 14, 2001. 23 The resolution
of September 14, 2001, does not provide a sound legal basis. 235 However,
neither Saddam Hussein nor the nation-state of Iraq have been linked to
the al Qaeda network or the events of September 11, although Hussein
may be preparing weapons of mass destruction.

229 Id. at 134-35. "America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security." Id.
at 135. "If [timid governments] do not act, America will." Id. "September the Eleventh
brought out the best in America, and the best in this Congress. And I join the American
people in applauding your unity and resolve." Id. President Bush was forceful and
assertive: "We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side ....
I will not wait on events
while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer." Id.
230

Id. at 134.

231 Id. at 135.
232 Id.

23
Senators Urge Bush to Make Case for Iraq War, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/
04/us.iraq/index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Senators].
234 Sources:
Lawyers Tell Bush He Does Not Need Congress to Attack Iraq, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/26/ us.iraq.ap/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Sources]. The President's inability to wage war without Congress hopefully
has become clear in the foregoing. The resolutions granting President George H. W. Bush
authority to act in Iraq were all in order to achieve implementation of a series of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions revolving around Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and
threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
235 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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In late August and September of 2002, Congress began to seriously
assert its role in the war powers process.236 Several members of
Congress were skeptical of any action and urged the use of an approval
resolution from Congress before action would be taken. 237 However,
some members placed more trust in the President. 238 On September 4,
2002, President Bush invited several members of Congress, including the
Speaker of the House, to the White House to discuss the Iraqi dilemma,
seeking the approval of Congress to use the American armed forces
unilaterally against President Hussein.239 On October 10, 2002, Congress
passed an authorization for the use of force against Iraq. 240 Upon almost

236In the end, President Bush stated that he intends to consult with Congress because
"Congress has an important role to play." Sources, supra note 234; see GOP Debate Over Iraq
Heats Up, at http:/ /www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/25/iraq.debate.ap/index.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2002) [hereinafter GOP] (describing Press Secretary Ari Fleischer as
stating that Congress' opinions are always welcome as support for his decisions that have
not yet been made).
237 E.g., Senators, supra note 233. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania stated that
collecting facts and presenting them to Congress would be critical to the President's efforts.
Id. Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, believed that there probably would be a war in Iraq. Id. Senator Joseph
Lieberman of Connecticut wanted the President to seek permission from Congress and
wanted to schedule a debate on the topic. Id.; see H Lawyers: Bush Can OrderIraq Attack,
at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/26/bush.iraq/ index.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2003) (House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt stated that it is imperative that a
debate and vote occur).
238 GOP, supra note 236 (noting that Congressman Tom DeLay of Texas stated that
President Bush had taken the advice of many people in Congress and that the President
wanted the input of Congress). Former Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi
did not think that there was a constitutional demand that the President come before
Congress, but he was confident that President Bush would do so anyway. Hill Leaders,
Bush to Talk Iraq, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/03/congress.iraq/
index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). Senator Lott expected that something specific
would be asked of Congress before overt action would begin. Id.
239 Bush Letter: 'America Intends to Lead,' at http://cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/04/
bush.letter/index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2003). At the meeting, President Bush
presented a letter stating, in part,
I am in the process of deciding how to proceed. This is an important
decision that must be made with great thought and care. Therefore, I
welcome and encourage discussion and debate. The Congress will
hold hearings on Iraq this month, and I have asked members of my
Administration to participate fully.
Id.
240 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-243,
116 Stat. 1497 (2002).
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two dozen findings and determinations, Congress resolved
President must, along with his normal reporting requirement,
own determinations regarding the necessity of such military
On March 18, 2003, President Bush dispatched such a letter to
242
as Operation Iraqi Freedom had begun.

that the
make his
action. 241
Congress

Given the months of public debate, the congressional action, and the
President's policies and actions, Operation Iraqi Freedom spawned from
a process and climate based on the War Powers Resolution. The
Resolution's legitimacy may only be traced by this sort of practice but
still remains constitutionally frail. The constitutional design of the war
powers has once again been ignored or, at least, swept asunder.
Andre Miksha*

See id. § 3, 116 Stat. at 1501.
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Commencement of Military
Operations Against Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 348 (Mar. 21, 2003); Letter to
Congressional Leaders on the Conclusion of Diplomatic Efforts with Regard to Iraq, id. 341
(Mar. 18, 2003).
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